Abstract. Boneh and Venkatesan have proposed a polynomial time algorithm in a non-uniform model for recovering a "hidden" element α ∈ IFp, where p is prime, from very short strings of the most significant bits of the residue of αt modulo p for several randomly chosen t ∈ IFp. Here we modify the scheme and amplify the uniformity of distribution of the 'multipliers' t and thus extend this result to subgroups of IF * p , which are more relevant to practical usage. As in the work of Boneh and Venkatesan, our result can be applied to the bit security of Diffie-Hellman related encryption schemes starting with subgroups of very small size, including all cryptographically interesting subgroups.
Introduction
For a prime p, denote by IF p the field of p elements and always assume that it is represented by the set {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}. Accordingly, sometimes, where obvious, we treat elements of IF p as integer numbers in the above range.
For a real η > 0 and t ∈ IF p we denote by MSB η (t) any integer which satisfies the inequality |t − MSB η (t)| < p2 −η−1 .
Roughly speaking, MSB η (t) is an integer having about η most significant bits as t. However, this definition is more flexible and better suited to our purposes. In particular we remark that η in the inequality (1) need not be an integer. Given a subgroup G ⊆ IF * p we consider the following hidden number problem over G:
for some η > 0.
For G = IF * p this problem has been introduced and studied by Boneh and Venkatesan [3, 4] . In [3] a polynomial time algorithm is designed which recovers α for some η ∼ (log p)
1/2 and k = O(log 1/2 p). The algorithm of [3] has been extended in several directions. In particular, in [8] it is generalised to all sufficiently large subgroups G ⊆ IF * p . This and other generalisations have led to a number of cryptographic applications, see [20] [21] [22] . Using bounds of exponential sums from [9, 11] it has been shown that the algorithm of [3] works for subgroups G ⊆ IF * p of order #G ≥ p ν+ε where for any ε > 0 and sufficiently large p one can take -ν = 1/3 for all primes, -ν = 0 for almost all primes p.
Using a recent improvement of [5] of the bounds of exponential sums over small subgroups of IF * p one can obtain the same result with ν = 0 for all primes p and thus extend the results of [3, 8] to subgroups of order #G ≥ p ε . For G = IF * p in [4] an algorithm is constructed which works with much smaller values η ∼ log log p, however this algorithm is non-uniform. This means that if the points t 1 , . . . , t k ∈ G are known in advance, one can design (in exponential time) a certain data structure, that now given k values MSB η (αt i ), i = 1, . . . , k, the hidden number α can be found in polynomial time. In the present paper we extend the algorithm of [4] to essentially arbitrary subgroups of IF * p . As in [4] we discuss possible applications of our algorithm to proving bit security results for several exponentiation based cryptographic schemes.
As in [3, 4] , the method is based on some properties of lattices, but also makes use of exponential sums, however not in such a direct way as in [8] . Namely, we introduce certain new arguments allowing to amplify the uniformity of distribution properties of small subgroups G. This allows us to use the bound of exponential sums from [10] with elements of G, which is very moderate in strength (and does not imply any uniformity of distribution properties of G which would be the crucial argument of the method of [8] ). The bound of [10] has however the very important advantage over the bounds of [5, 9, 11] that it applies to subgroups of order #G ≥ log p (log log p) 1−ε .
It is interesting to note that our approach has links with the famous Waring problem which has been studied in number theory for several hundred years. In fact, the Waring problem in finite fields has been the main motivation of the bound of exponential sums of [10] which we use in this paper. For surveys of recent results on this problem see [6, 10, 25] . We also remark that a uniform algorithm, which is also based on a similar use of the bound of [10] and which improves the results of [8] , has recently been proposed in [23] .
Throughout the paper log x always denotes the binary logarithm of x > 0 and the constants in the 'O'-symbols may occasionally, where obvious, depend on a small positive parameter ε and are absolute otherwise. We always assume that p is a prime number with p ≥ 5, thus the expression log log p is defined (and positive).
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Exponential sums and distribution of short sums of elements of subgroups
For a complex z we put e p (z) = exp(2πiz/p).
Now by Theorem 1 of [10] we have the following bound, see also [6, 11] .
holds.
For an integer k ≥ 1, a subgroup G ⊆ IF * p and t ∈ IF p we denote by N k (G, t) the number of solutions of the equation
Recalling the relation between the set of nth powers, where n = (p − 1)/T , we see that studying the above congruence is equivalent to studying the congruence
p . The problem of finding the smallest possible value of k for which the congruence (or in more traditional settings the corresponding equation over Z Z) has a solution for any t is known as the Waring problem. However for our purposes just a solvability is not enough. Rather we need an asymptotic formula for the number of solutions.
We show that Lemma 1 can be used to prove that for reasonably small k, N k (G, t) is close to its expected value.
Lemma 2. For any 1 > ε > 0 there exists a constant C(ε) > 0 such that for any subgroup G ⊆ IF * p , of order
holds for any integer k ≥ C(ε)(log p) 2+ε .
Proof. The well-known identity (see for example [14, Chapter 5.1])
implies that
Separating the term T k /p, corresponding to λ = 0, and applying Lemma 1 to other terms, we obtain
and the desired result follows.
Rounding in lattices
Let B = (b 1 , . . . , b s ) T ∈ IR s×s be a nonsingular s × s matrix over the set of real numbers IR with rows b 1 , . . . , b s . The set of vectors
spanned by the rows of B, is called an s-dimensional full rank lattice associated with the matrix B. The set {b 1 , . . . , b s } is called a basis of L.
One of the most fundamental problems in this area is the closest vector problem. This problem can be defined with respect to any vector norm w as follows: given a basis of a lattice L in IR s and a target vector u ∈ IR s , find a lattice vector v ∈ L with
It is well known that the closest vector problem in the Euclidean norm is NPhard (see [16, 17] for references). However, its approximate version [2] admits a polynomial time algorithm which goes back to the lattice basis reduction algorithm of Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász [12] , see also [1] for more recent developments. However, it has been noticed in [4] that for some special class of lattices a simple rounding technique gives an exact solution to the closest vector problem. Here we summarise several results from [4] which underlie this technique and its applications to the hidden number problem.
For our purposes the L 1 -norm is most relevant thus from now on we always assume that w =
is always assumed to be defined with respect to the L 1 -norm.
Given a target vector u ∈ IR s , using standard linear algebra tools, we find its representation in the basis {b 1 , . . . ,
where for w ∈ IR, w denotes the closest integer (in the case of 2w ∈ Z Z we put w = w ). Clearly, u ∈ L but certainly it is not the closest (or even just a close) vector. Now, for a matrix C ∈ IR s×s with columns c The following statement, which is essentially [4, Lemma 2.1], gives a sufficient condition under which u is a solution to the closest vector problem for u.
We consider the lattice L(t 1 , . . . , t d ) spanned by the rows of the matrix
The next statement follows from [4, Theorem 2.2].
Lemma 4. Let p be a prime and d > 4 + log p + log log p. Let t 1 , . . . , t d ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p−1} be integers chosen uniformly and independently at random. Then with probability at least 1/2 there exists a basis of the lattice L(t 1 , . . . , t d ) spanned by rows of a certain matrix C with entries of polynomial size (log p) O(1) and with
Nonuniform algorithm
For an integer w we denote by w p the remainder of w on division by p.
Assume that for α ∈ IF * p and a subgroup G ⊆ IF * p of order T , generated by g ∈ IF * p , we are given an oracle HN P µ such that for every x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}, it returns MSB µ αg x p . Theorem 1. For any 1 > ε > 0 there exists a constant a(ε) > 0 such that, for µ = a(ε) log log p, for any g ∈ IF * p of order T ≥ log p (log log p) 1−ε after taking a polynomial number (log p) O(1) of advice bits depending only on p and G but independent on α, one can design a deterministic algorithm which makes O (log p) 3+ε calls of the oracle HN P µ and then recovers α in polynomial time.
Proof. Put
where C(ε) is given by Lemma 2.
The advice bits which we request describe:
-the values of t 1 , . . . , t d ∈ IF p for which the lattice L(t 1 , . . . , t d ) is spanned by a matrix C with ρ(C −1 ) < 3d log p p , which exist by Lemma 4, and the above matrix C;
-the exponents x hj , h = 1, . . . , d, j = 1, . . . , k with
which exist by Lemma 2.
We call the oracle with x = 0 getting an approximation u 0 = MSB µ (α). Now we call the oracle HN P µ for the dk integers
and get integers u hj with
For h = 1, 2, . . . , d we put
where all the additions are over Z Z.
Note that for sufficiently large p,
where
for an appropriate value of a(ε) and sufficiently large p.
Therefore,
and the result follows by Lemma 3.
Application to Diffie-Hellman related schemes
Our result applies to the establishing bit security of the same exponentiation based cryptographic schemes as those of [4] . Such schemes include, but are not limited to, the Okamoto conference sharing scheme and a certain modification of the ElGamal scheme, see [4] for more details.
The main distinction between our result and that of [4] is that we do not need anymore assume that the generating element is a primitive root, which is a rather impractical assumption. Indeed, in practical applications of the DiffieHellman and other related schemes, one would probably choose a subgroup of IF * p of prime order T . Moreover, it is quite reasonable to choose T of size about exp c(log p) 1/3 (log log p) 2/3 for some constant c > 0, in order to balance time complexities of the number field sieve based attacks and Pollard's rho-method based attacks, see [7, 15, 18, 19, 24] . Thus our result closes the gap between the settings of [4] and settings more relevant to practical usage of the above schemes.
It also seems to be plausible that one can obtain similar, albeit slightly weaker, results for other cryptographically interesting subgroups in finite fields and rings, for which relevant bounds of character sums are available. For example, such bounds are known for XTR subgroups, see [13] .
